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A conjecture on the distribution of firm profit
Ian Wright∗†
Abstract
A common assumption of political economy is that profit rates across
firms or sectors tend to uniformity, and often models are formulated in
which this tendency is assumed to have been realised. But in reality this
tendency is never realised and the distribution of firm profits is not de-
generate but skewed to the right. The mode is less than the mean and
super-profits are present. To understand the distribution of firm prof-
its a general probabilistic argument is sketched that yields a candidate
functional form. The overall properties of the derived distribution are
qualitatively consistent with empirical measures, although there is more
work to be done.
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1 Introduction
Farjoun and Machover [2], dissatisfied with the concept of mechanical equilib-
rium applied to political economy and the concomitant assumption of a realised
uniform profit rate, outlined a probabilistic approach to political economy, which
replaced mechanical equilibrium with statistical equilibrium and a uniform profit
rate with a distribution of profit rates. They reasoned that the proportion of
industrial capital, out of the total capital invested in the economy, which finds
itself in any given profit bracket will be approximated by a gamma distribution,
by analogy with the distribution of kinetic energy in a gas at equilibrium. The
gamma distribution is a right-skewed distribution. They examined UK industry
data from 1972 and concluded that it was consistent with a gamma distribution.
Wells [6] examined the distributions of profit rates defined in a variety of ways
of over 100,000 UK firms and found right-skewness to be prevalent, but did
not investigate their functional form. Wright [7] measured the distribution of
firm profits in an agent-based model of a competitive economy, and found that
the distribution was right-skewed, although not well characterised by a gamma
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distribution, even when capital-weighted. Analysis of the model suggested that
the profit distribution may be explained by general probabilistic laws.
The remainder of the paper outlines some theoretical assumptions and de-
rives a candidate functional form for the distribution of firm profits.
2 A probabilistic argument
Under normal circumstances a firm expects that a worker adds a value to the
product that is bound from below by the wage. A firm’s markup on costs reflects
this value expectation, which may or may not be validated in the market. Wages
are normally paid in installments of between a week and one month, but the
markup on costs is validated in the market at a frequency that depends on the
rate at which a firm’s goods and services are purchased by buyers. The frequency
of payments to a firm differ widely and depend on the complexity of the product
and the details of payment schedules (for example, compare a firm that sells
sweets to a firm that sells battleships). The frequency mismatch between wage
payments and revenue payments can be mitigated in many different ways, not
least by the arrangement of capital loans. But whatever the frequency of sale
or the complexity of the product a revenue payment to a firm partially reflects
the value added by the firm’s workers during a period of time. Assume that the
revenue from the sale of a firm’s product consists of a sum of market samples
where each sample represents the value-added by a particular employee working
for a small period of time, say an hour. Obviously, there are multiple and
particular reasons why an individual worker adds more or less value to the firm’s
total product, most of which are difficult to measure, as partially reflected in
the large variety of contested and negotiable compensation schemes. Although
each worker normally adds value there is a great deal of local contingency. A
worker may be a slacker or a workaholic, an easily replaceable administrator, or a
unique, currently fashionable film star. Therefore, the precise value contribution
of an individual worker to the product is highly complex and largely unknown,
particularly when it is considered that the productive co-operation of many
workers cannot be easily reduced to separate and orthogonal contributions, as
is the case in highly creative industries with production processes that have
yet to mature into separable, repeatable and well-defined tasks. This local
contingency and indeterminacy is modelled by assuming that the value-added
per worker-hour is a random variable. Consider that a worker i adds a monetary
value, Xi, to a firm’s product for every hour worked, where each Xi is an
independent and identically distributed (iid) random variable, with mean µX
and variance σ2X . The added value is assumed to be globally idd to reflect the
common determinants of the value-creating power of an hour of work, but also
random to model local contingencies. Negative Xi represents negative value-
added, corresponding to cases in which the worker’s labour reduces the value of
inputs, for example the production of unwanted goods, or a slower than average
work pace, and so forth.
Assume that the distribution of Xi is such that the Central Limit Theorem
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(CLT) may be applied. Consider a single firm that sets in motion a total of n
worker-hours during a single year. The firm’s total value-added, Sn, may there-
fore be approximated by a normal distribution Sn =
∑n
i=1Xi ≈ N(nµX , nσ2X).
The CLT approximation will improve with the size of the firm, but even for
small firms the number of iid draws is large given the stated assumptions.
In reality the productivity of workers within firms is correlated. For example,
employees of firms that employ state-of-the-art machinery, or are exceptionally
well-organised, will all tend to add more value than employees of firms that
employ out-of-date machinery or are badly organised. Although competitive
processes tend to homogenise the value-added per worker, new innovations never
cease, so that at any moment in time the employees of particular firm will be
more or less productive than the average. A more accurate representation of
value-added is obtained if each Xi is considered to be drawn from a distribution
indexed by the firm that employs worker i, at the expense of a considerable
increase in model complexity. However, the correlation of value-added within a
large firm, which employs diverse skills and machinery to produce a variety of
products, will be weak. Although a huge multinational is normally considered a
single entity for the purpose of reporting profits, in reality it sets into a motion
a large sample of different kinds of labours utilising different kinds of machinery
and tools. Hence, for large firms the assumption that Xi is sampled from a
single, economy-wide distribution is a reasonable approximation, for small firms
less so. An advantage of modelling value-added per worker as a random variable
is that it is possible that total value-added by a firm, Sn, is much higher or lower
than the norm, but this event has low probability. The assumption of a single
distribution that determines the value-added per worker is able to approximate
the diverse productivities of individual firms.
Each worker costs a certain amount to employ during the year. This cost
includes the wage, the cost of inputs used by the worker, the cost of wear and
tear on any fixed capital, the cost of rent, local taxes and so forth, all of which
may be differently reported due to local accountancy practices. Again, there is
a great deal of contingency. Hence costs per worker-hour are also modelled as a
random variable. Assume that a worker i costs a monetary value, Yi, to produc-
tively employ per hour worked, where each Yi is an idd random variable with
mean µY and variance σ
2
Y . This cost includes both the wage and capital costs
per worker, and therefore effaces the distinction between variable and constant
capital. Costs per worker-hour are also correlated at the firm level: the employ-
ees of different firms productively combine a greater or lesser amount of capital.
A more accurate representation of costs would therefore consider the distribu-
tion of constant capital across firms conditional on local circumstances, such as
firm size, but this extension is not pursued here. The assumption that cost per
worker-hour is statistically unifrom across firms is an approximation, which, as
for the case of value-added, improves with firm size, under the assumption of a
tendency toward homogenisation due to competitive pressures.
Assume that the distribution of Yi is such that the CLT may be applied.
Hence a firm that sets in motion n worker-hours during a year has total costs that
may be approximated by a normal distribution, Kn =
∑n
i=1 Yi ≈ N(nµY , nσ2Y ).
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This approximation also improves with the size of the firm.
Different firms employee different numbers of workers and hence the amount
of hours worked for each firm during a year will vary. Define the profit, Pn, of a
firm that sets in motion n hours of labour in a single year as the ratio of value-
added to costs, Pn = Sn/Kn, and assume that Sn and Kn are independent. Pn
is the ratio of two normal variates. Its probability density function (pdf) may
derived by the transformation method (or alternatively see [5]) to give:
fPn(p | n) =
√
n exp[− 12n(µ2X/σ2X + µ2Y /σ2Y )]
4pi(σ2X + p
2σ2Y )
3/2(
2√
n
√
λ1 +
√
2pi exp[
n
2
λ22
λ1
]λ2
(
1 + Φ[
√
n
2
λ2√
λ1
]
))
(1)
where
λ1 = σ
2
Xσ
2
Y (σ
2
X + p
2σ2Y )
λ2 = µY σ
2
X + pµXσ
2
Y
Φ(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
exp−t
2
dt
Equation (1) is the pdf of the rate-of-profit of a firm conditional on n, the
number of hours worked for the firm per year.
Axtell [1] analysed US Census Bureau data for US firms trading between
1988 and 1997 and found that the firm size distribution, where size is measured
by the number of employees, followed a special case of a power-law known as
Zipf’s law, and this relationship persisted from year to year despite the continual
birth and demise of firms and other major economic changes. During this period
the number of reported firms increased from 4.9 million to 5.5 million. Gaffeo et.
al. [4] found that the size distribution of firms in the G7 group over the period
1987-2000 also followed a power-law, but only in limited cases was the power-
law actually Zipf. Fuijiwara et. al. [3] found that the Zipf law characterised
the size distribution of about 260,000 large firms from 45 European countries
during the years 1992–2001. A Zipf law implies that a majority of small firms
coexist with a decreasing number of disproportionately large firms. Firm sizes
theoretically range from 1 (a degenerate case of a self-employed worker) to the
whole available workforce, representing a highly unlikely monopolisation of the
whole economy by a single firm.
The empirical evidence implies that at any point in time the firm size distri-
bution follows a power-law, and that this distribution is constant, despite the
continual churning of firms in the economy (birth, death, shrinkage and growth).
Firms hire and fire employees, and therefore the number of hours worked for
a firm during a year depends on its particular historical growth pattern. To
simplify, assume that the average number of employees per firm per year also
follows a power-law. This approximation is reasonable if the growth trajectories
of firms do not fluctuate too widely during the accounting period. Assume also
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that every employee works the same number of hours in a year, which is a rea-
sonable simplification. The firm hours per year is therefore a constant multiple
of the number of firm employees. Firms with more employees proportionately
set in motion more hours of labour. A constant multiple of a power-law vari-
ate is also a power-law variate. Hence, the firm size distribution has the same
power-law form whether firm size is measured by employees or by the total
number of hours worked by employees.
The unconditional rate-of-profit distribution can therefore be obtained by
considering that the number of hours worked for a firm during a year is a
random variable N distributed according to a Pareto (power-law) distribution:
fN (n) =
αβα
nα+1
where α is the shape and β the location parameter. Assume that firm sizes
range between m1 hours, which represents a degenerate case of a self-employed
worker who trades during the year, to m2 hours, which represents a highly
unlikely monopolisation of all social labour by a single huge firm (m2 >> m1).
The truncated Pareto distribution
gN(n) = fN(n | m1 < N ≤ m2) = fN(n)
FN (m2)− FN (m1) =
n−(1+α)αmα1m
α
2
mα2 −mα1
where
f(n) = F ′(n)
is formed to ensure that all the probability mass is betweenm1 and m2. Assume
that m2 is large so that the discrete firm size distribution can be approximated
by the continuous distribution gN .
By the Theorem of Total Probability the unconditional profit distribution
fP (p) is given by:
fP (p) =
∫ m2
m1
fP (p | n)gN (n)dn (2)
Expression (2) defines the gN(n) parameter-mix of fP (p | N = n). The rate-of-
profit variate is therefore composed of a parameter-mix of a ratio of independent
normal variates each conditional on a firm size n, measured in hours per year,
distributed according to a power-law. Writing (2) in full yields the pdf of firm
profit:
fP (p) =
∫ m2
m1
exp[− 12n(µ2X/σ2X + µ2Y /σ2Y )]
4pi(σ2X + p
2σ2Y )
3/2(
2√
n
√
λ1 +
√
2pi exp[
n
2
λ22
λ1
]λ2
(
1 + Φ[
√
n
2
λ2√
λ1
]
))
n−(
1
2
+α)αmα1m
α
2
mα2 −mα1
dn (3)
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This distribution has 7 parameters: (i) µX , the mean value-added per worker-
hour, (ii) σ2X , the variance of value-added per worker-hour, (iii) µY , the mean
cost per worker-hour, (iv) σ2Y , the variance of cost per worker-hour, (v) α, the
Pareto exponent of the firm size power-law distribution, where size is measured
in worker-hours per year, (vi) m1, the number of hours worked by a single
worker in a year, and (vii) m2, the total number of hours worked in the whole
economy during a year. Both percentage profit, R = 100P , and the growth rate
of capital invested, G = 1+P , are simple linear transforms of this distribution.
The parameters can be estimated from economic data and the resulting
distribution compared to empirical rate-of-profit measures, under various sim-
plifying assumptions about how profit is defined (e.g. see Wells [6]). A good
fit would imply that the assumptions made in the theoretical derivation are
empirically sound. Alternatively, best-fit parameters may be directly estimated
from empirical data, for example by the method of maximum likelihood estima-
tion, to determine how well the theoretical distribution can fit a set of empirical
distributions. A good fit compared to other candidate functional forms would
imply that a parameter-mix of a ratio of normal variates with parameters con-
ditional on a power-law captures some essential structure of the determinants
of firm profit, but it would not validate the theoretical derivation.
Equation (3) is difficult to analyse so numerical solutions are employed.
Figure 1 graphs some representative numerical samples of the distribution. The
samples range from sharply peaked symmetrical curves, in which most of the
probability mass is concentrated about the mode, to less peaked distributions
that are skewed to the right. Wells’ [6] variety of profit measures yield distribu-
tions that share these characteristics, and therefore there is qualitative agree-
ment between the theory and the empirical data. But clearly a full quantitative
analysis is required.
Figure 2 graphs a sample of fP (p) in log-log scale. The approximate straight
line in the tail is the signature of a power-law decay of the probability of super-
profits. Super-profit outliers are found in the empirical data, although it has
not been investigated whether they decay as an approximate power-law.
Further analysis of the pdf fP (x) is required. But the qualitative form of the
distribution is sufficiently encouraging to consider it a candidate for fitting to
empirical profit measures and for comparison with other candidate functional
forms. To go beyond models that assume a realised uniform profit rate it is
necessary to investigate empirical data on firm profit and propose theoretical
explanations of its distribution. This paper is a tentative step in that direction.
3 Conclusion
A general probabilistic argument suggests that the empirical rate-of-profit distri-
bution will be consistent with a parameter-mix of a ratio of normal variates with
means and variances that depend on a firm size parameter that is distributed
according to a power law.
6
pf
mX=3 sX2=625 mY=1 sY2=1 a=0.5 m1=1 m2=100
-5 10
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
p
f
mX=4 sX2=4 mY=1 sY2=1 a=1 m1=1 m2=100
-1 8
0.025
0.05
0.075
0.1
0.125
0.15
0.175
p
f
mX=3 sX2=1 mY=1 sY2=1 a=2.5 m1=1 m2=100
-1 10
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
p
f
mX=7 sX2=1 mY=7 sY2=1 a=4.5 m1=1 m2=100
-1 4
0.5
1
1.5
2
p
f
mX=1 sX2=1 mY=1 sY2=1 a=0.5 m1=1 m2=100
-1 4
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
p
f
mX=1 sX2=1 mY=9 sY2=1 a=4.5 m1=1 m2=100
-1 4
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
(a) Samples plotted on separate scales.
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(b) The same samples plotted on a single scale.
Figure 1: Representative numerical samples of the probability density function
fP (p).
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Figure 2: A sample of fP (p) plotted in log-log scale. Note the long power-law
tail.
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